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Tice v. Department of Transportation: A Declining Role
for the Attorney General?
In North Carolina, as in most states, the rights and powers inherent in the
Office of the Attorney General have been established and defined by the common law and by constitutional and statutory provisions.' One of the powers
widely held to vest in the Office is the prerogative to manage and control litigation involving state and public interests. 2 In Tice v. Department of Transportation3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals announced an exception to this
general principle, holding void a consent judgment entered into by an assistant
attorney general. In Tice an assistant attorney general had represented defendant Department of Transportation (DOT) and had failed to obtain the agency's
agreement to the consent judgment. Although the court left undisturbed the
Attorney General's power to manage litigation when bringing an action or prosecuting an appeal in the State's name, the court concluded that an attorney general acting in a representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department
is bound by the traditional rules governing the attorney-client relationship and
4
may not concede the client's substantive rights without the client's approval.
This Note analyzes the Tice decision to determine whether the court's ruling is consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law delineations of
the powers vested in the attorney general. The court in Tice focused attention
on the appropriateness of separating the roles of chief law officer and representative counsel5 and, in the latter role, reduced the attorney general's customary
responsibility to serve as protector of the interests of the state and public. This
Note concludes that Tice is consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law concepts of the power of the attorney general. Because the court failed
to restrict its holding, however, the possibility remains that further limitations
on the Attorney General's powers may be imposed.
In Tice plaintiff sought to establish title to a parcel of land connecting a
1. See generally COMMITEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW PoWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
(1980) (concise overview of the historical development of the office of attorney general and the specific common-law powers vested in the offices of attorneys general) [hereinafter cited as COMMON
LAW PowERs]; COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-

TION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1977) (focusing primarily on present-day powers, but also including a history of the
development of the office of attorney general) [hereinafter cited as POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS]; Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina, 9 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 1 (1977) (examining the development of the Office of Attorney General in North
Carolina).
2. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 1, at 68; POWER,

DUTIES AND OPERATIONS,

supra note 1, at 194.
3. 67 N.C. App. 48, 312 S.E.2d 241 (1984).
4. Id. at 57, 312 S.E.2d at 246.
5. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 10, 18 (distinguishing the roles of chief law officer and counsel to
state agencies and departments).
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6
state road to the waters of Tulls Creek Bay in northeastern North Carolina.

Defendant DOT also claimed an interest in the land. After protracted negotiations, 7 the Assistant Attorney General representing the DOT8 entered into a
consent agreement with plaintiff, setting the boundaries of the state road and

enjoining plaintiff from interfering with use of the road. Defendant DOT filed a
motion to set aside the agreement, asserting that the stipulations on which it was
based were untrue and that the Assistant Attorney General lacked authority to
enter into the consent agreement without the DOT's approval. 9
The court of appeals invalidated the agreement, basing its holding on the
legislative delegation to the DOT of exclusive authority for decisions affecting
the state highway system.10 Judge Whichard, writing for a unanimous panel,

reasoned that the attorney general's common-law power to control litigation
reaches its limit when exercise of that authority would usurp the exclusive authority expressly granted to a state department by the legislature.1 1 Tice, therefore, stands for the proposition that the powers inherent in the attorney general

are less extensive when the attorney general is engaged as counsel to a state
agency or department than when he brings an action or prosecutes an appeal on
behalf of the state itself.

The Office of the North Carolina Attorney General was created in the state
constitution. Article III, section 7(1) of the North Carolina Constitution provides for the quadrennial election of the attorney general, 12 and section 7(2)

states that the attorney general's duties "shall be prescribed by law." 13 Article 6
of the Executive Organization Act of 1971 further provides that "[t]he Attorney
General shall have such powers and duties as are conferred on him by this Chapter, delegated to him by the Governor, and conferred by the Constitution and
14
laws of this State."

The body of law that defines the duties and related powers vested in the

constitutionally created Office of Attorney General is derived from statutory
6. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief to prohibit defendant DOT from trespassing on her
property. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 49, 312 S.E.2d at 242.
7. Negotiations between the Assistant Attorney General and plaintiff lasted for almost two
years, during which time the Assistant Attorney General maintained regular contact with officials of
defendant. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 12-13.
8. The Assistant Attorney General represented defendant DOT pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 114-4.2 (1983), which states:
The Attorney General is authorized to appoint from among his staff such assistant attorneys general and such other staff attorneys as he shall deem advisable to provide all legal
assistance for the State highway functions of the Department of Transportation, and such
assistant attorneys general and other attorneys shall also perform such additional duties as
may be assigned to them by the Attorney General, and shall otherwise be subject to all
provisions of the statutes relating to assistant attorneys general and other staff attorneys.
9. Defendant also alleged that the stipulations upon which the consent judgment was based
were executed by the Assistant Attorney General "by mistake and inadvertence under a misapprehension of the true facts." Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 50, 312 S.E.2d at 242.
10. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
11. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 54, 312 S.E.2d at 245; see also infra note 42 and accompanying text
(attorney general may not concede state agency's substantive rights without agency's consent).
12. N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 7(l).
13. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(2).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143A-49.1 (1983).
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provisions' s and the common law. The statutory provisions, although extensive,
do not expressly enumerate the powers inherent in the attorney general. The
attorney general's common-law powers, specifically the authority to initiate,
conduct, and maintain legal actions, have developed throughout the evolution of
the Office. 1 6 There is some authority for the proposition that the North Carolina Attorney General retains the common-law powers of the Office, 17 but the
state's courts never have ruled expressly on the extent of these powers."' The
North Carolina General Assembly has provided that when the common law is
not antithetical to the state's elemental system of government, it shall be applicable. 19 Because of the lack of North Carolina cases dealing with the common-law
powers of the attorney general, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions for
an understanding of the development of these powers.
The office of attorney general had its nascence in the attornatus regis of
thirteenth and fourteenth century England. 20 The attornatusregis served as the
sovereign's primary legal representative, with considerable power subject to limitation only by the King. The office was carried over to colonial America, where
it eventually became the office of attorney general. All fifty states have an office
of attorney general created either by constitution or statute.2 1 The specific powers and duties vested in the office vary greatly among the states. Although some
states restrict the attorney general's common-law powers by express statutory or
constitutional language, 22 the large majority of states have chosen to recognize
23
the existence of these powers.
The most far reaching of the attorney general's common-law powers is the
authority to control litigation involving state and public interests. It is generally
accepted that the attorney general is authorized to bring actions on the state's
behalf.2 4 As the state's chief legal officer, "the attorney-general has power, both
under common law and by statute, to make any disposition of the state's litigation that he deems for its best interest. . . . [H]e may abandon, discontinue,
15. Id. § 114-2.
16. See COMMON LAW PowE.s, supra note 1, at 68; PowERs, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS,
supra note 1, at 194.
17. See, eg., Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116
(1968) (common-law power to protect beneficiaries of charitable trusts); State v. Thompson, 10 N.C.
(3 Hawks) 613 (1825) (common-law power to enter a nolle prosequi); In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.,
30 N.C. App. 585, 227 S.E.2d 645 (1976) (common-law investigatory powers).
18. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 2.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1981).
20. For a more detailed description of the development of the Office of Attorney General from
its origins in England through the colonial period, see COMMON LAW PowERs, supra note 1, at 914; PowERs, DunaEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 17-22.
21. See PowERs, DtrIEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 30-31.
22. See, eg., Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Hawaii 259, 554 P.2d 761 (1976) (attorney general has exclusive authority to control all phases of civil litigation in which state has an
interest, unless authority has been expressly or impiledly granted to another department); State ex
rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973) (common-law duties and powers
inhere in attorney general absent express statutory or constitutional restrictions).
23. See COMMON LAW POwERs supra note 1, at 25-27 (identifying 35 states in which the
attorney general is recognized as having common-law powers).
24. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 10.
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dismiss or compromise it."'25 In addition to having authority to initiate and
manage an action, the attorney general may elect not to pursue a claim or to

compromise or settle a suit when he determines that continued litigation would
26
be adverse to the public interest.
Most courts have given the attorney general "a broad discretion

. . .

in

determining what matters may, or may not be, of interest to the people generally." 27 The investment of such discretion is based on the premise that the attorney general should act on behalf of the public interest, or as the "people's
attorney." 2 8 In an early North Carolina Supreme Court decision, the court re-

fused to interfere with the attorney general's use of his discretionary power to
enter a nolle prosequi on grounds that the authority had not been used "oppres-

sively." 29 Other courts have left undisturbed the use of the power to control
litigation as long as the attorney general's actions are not arbitrary, capricious,
30

or in bad faith.
Like the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the courts of several other juris-

dictions have recognized limitations on the attorney general's powers when "authority. . . has been expressly or impliedly granted to another department or
agency."' 31 An attorney general's authority may be restricted explicitly by the
statutes governing the office, or it may be impliedly limited by legislative assignment of certain powers to another state governmental body. Thus, the constitutional and statutory framework underlying a legislature's delegation of powers
must be read in its entirety to determine the extent of the attorney general's
authority.
The court inTice expressly acknowledged the attorney general's common25. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 671, 280 P. 910, 912 (1929).
26. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975); Lyle
v. Luna, 65 N.M. 429, 338 P.2d 1060 (1959); Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 51, 312 S.E.2d at 243; State ex
reL Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); Cooley v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (per curiam). But cf. Arizona State Land Dep't v.
McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960) (attorney general has no power to initiate and pursue
claims in the public interest except in a few instances in which power is conferred specifically by
statute).
27. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921).
The breadth of the modern attorney general's discretion resembles that of his common-law
counterpart. In reviewing the historical development of the Office of Attorney General, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
As chief legal representative to the king, the common law attorney general was clearly
subject to the wishes of the crown, but, even in those times, the office was also a repository
of power and discretion. . . . Transportation of the institution to this country, where governmental initiative was diffused among the officers of the executive branch and the many
individuals comprising the legislative branch could only broaden this area of the attorney
general's discretion.
Florida ex rel Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 930
(1976).
28. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 36.
29. State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 613, 614 (1825).
30. See, eg., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977) (discretionary
power not to be used in arbitrary or capricious manner); Cooley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (Attorney General found to have acted in good faith).
31. Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Hawaii 259, 265, 554 P.2d 761, 765-66 (1976); see
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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law power to control litigation when acting on behalf of the state. 32 The court,
however, refused to extend this authority to situations in which the attorney
general acts in a representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department. The court reached its holding after reviewing the statutory powers of
both the attorney general and the affected agency.
North Carolina General Statutes section 147-17 provides the statutory basis
33
for the attorney general's representation of state agencies and departments.
The attorney general is afforded the exclusive power of representation: "No department, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other organized activity of
the State which receives support in whole or in part from the State shall employ
any counsel, except with the approval of the Governor."'34 The governor is authorized to hire other counsel on behalf of an agency or department "[w]henever
the Attorney General shall advise [him] that it is impracticable for [the Attorney
General] to render legal services to [the] State agency."' 35 One commentator has
suggested that "the courts would probably construe this statute as exclusive and
would not permit appointment or employment of counsel other than the Attorney General by state agencies in situations not specified by North Carolina General Statutes [section] 147-17."36 These statutory provisions indicate that the
general assembly intended to limit state agencies' use of outside counsel and
that, absent unusual circumstances, the attorney general is to be their sole legal
representative. Although neither the general assembly nor the courts have identified explicitly those circumstances under which it would be "impracticable" for
37
the attorney general to provide legal services to an agency or department, it is
arguable that Tice presents such a fact setting. When the attorney general believes that a compromise or consent agreement is in the best interest of the state
and the public and when such an agreement would concede the agency's best
interest, gubernatorial appointment of outside counsel on behalf of the affected
would be consistent with North Carolina General Statutes section 147agency
8
17.3
The North Carolina General Assembly has created a complex framework
32. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 51, 312 S.E.2d at 243.

33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17 (1983).
34. Id. § 147-17(a).
35. Id. § 147-17(b).
36. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 21.
37. For a general discussion of the role of the Attorney General as counsel for state agencies
and departments, see Edmisten, supra note 1, at 18-21. Edmisten states that "North Carolina has
not produced significant judicial statements on the common law authority of the Attorney General
to represent state agencies to the exclusion of other counsel." Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
38. See, eg., Clerk of Superior Court v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 386 Mass. 517, 437
N.E.2d 158 (1982) (special counsel appointed when Attorney General determined that further litigation of case was not in the public's interest); Teleco, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 649
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1982) (special counsel appointed when Attorney General was personally disqualified
because of prior membership on defendant commission).
The court inTice expressed concern that vesting power in the Attorney General to enter into a
consent agreement without the consent of the agency "could cause State agencies and departments,
with the approval of the Governor as required by G.S. 147-17(a), to engage in more extensive employment of their own counsel. . . .This practice would. . . cause additional expense to the State."
Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 55, 312 S.E.2d at 245. Because of this potential for added expense, § 147-17
should be construed narrowly to preclude wholesale use of outside counsel by agencies and depart-
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of institutional bodies it believes are needed to provide the services essential to
the people of the State. The Executive Organization Act enumerates these various state agencies, departments, bureaus, and commissions and their respective
areas of responsibility. 39 The court in Tice focused on the purposes and powers
of the DOT as delineated in the pertinent statutes.4° From its research the court
determined, "It is thus clear that the legislature has provided a comprehensive

scheme in which all decisions relating to the State highway system have been
'4 1
delegated to defendant DOT."

After reviewing the statutes governing the powers and duties of the Attorney General and the DOT, the court concluded that a consent agreement en-

tered into by the Assistant Attorney General derogated the responsibilities and
authority of the DOT and contravened the legislative intent evidenced by care-

fully delineated areas of responsibility. In recognizing the primacy of these statutory provisions, the court rejected application of the common-law notions
governing the Office of Attorney General.
We do not believe the legislature, by providing that the Attorney General would serve as counsel for State departments, intended to authorize him to make decisions in areas which have been specifically
delegated to a designated department. That would be the effect of al-

lowing the Attorney General to enter, without the consent of defendant DOT, a consent judgment which establishes the boundaries of a
road and gives defendant DOT a right-of-way. We believe, instead,

that the legislature intended that when the Attorney General represents a State department pursuant to G.S. 114-2(2), the traditional at-

torney-client relationship should exist. 42

ments dissatisfied with the attorney general's decisions regarding proper handling of litigation. See
also infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate use of outside counsel).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143A-I to -245, 143B-1 to -492 (1983).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-346 (1983) provides that the DOT
is to provide for the necessary planning, construction, maintenance, and operation of an
integrated statewide transportation system for the economical and safe transportation of
people and goods as provided for by law. . . .The Department of Transportation shall be
responsible for all of the transportation functions of the executive branch of the State as
provided by law ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18(2) (Supp. 1983) states that the DOT has power
to locate and acquire rights-of-way for any new roads that may be necessary for a State
highway system, with full power to widen, relocate, change or alter the grade or location
thereof and to change or relocate any existing roads that the Department of Transportation
may now own or may acquire; to acquire by gift, purchase, or otherwise, any road or
highway, or tract of land or other property whatsoever that may be necessary for a State
highway system.
41. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 54, 312 S.E.2d at 245.
42. Id. It is well established in North Carolina that in the traditional attorney-client relationship an attorney cannot enter into a consent agreement on behalf of his client without the client's
consent. Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 118 S.E.2d 897 (1961); Bath v. Norman, 226 NC. 502,
39 S.E.2d 363 (1946). An attorney, by virtue of inherent and implied authority, has considerable
discretionary power in the management and control of litigation in which he is involved. Absent
fraud or collusion, an attorney's actions, particularly those dealing with procedural matters, generally will be held to bind his client. Bath, 226 N.C. at 506, 39 S.E.2d at 365; Bizzell v. Auto Tire and
Equip. Co., 182 N.C. 98, 108 S.E. 439 (1921). The courts, however, have been unwilling to deprive
the individual litigant of the power to make decisions that constitute a compromise or concession of
substantive rights in litigation. Bath, 226 N.C. at 506, 39 S.E.2d at 365. The attorney has neither
inherent nor implied authority to compromise his client's cause or to consent to a judgment that
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Thus, the DOT's statutorily conferred authority to determine the location of
state roads and rights-of-way 43 constituted a substantive right not to be compromised or conceded without the Department's consent. 44 The Assistant Attorney
General's disputed consent agreement constituted a usurpation of these powers
in that it conceded the "whole corpus" of the Department's position. 45
Although the logic of Tice is compelling, 4 6 the historical role of the attorney general as chief law officer and defender of the public interest may be undermined if certain principles underlying the holding are applied broadly. If the
traditional attorney-client relationship is extended to all aspects of the attorney
general's representation of state agencies and departments, thus eliminating the
attorney general's common-law power to control litigation whenever he acts in a
representative capacity, the decision could lead to a number of anomalous
results.
Some authorities contend that, when acting as counsel to a state department or agency, the attorney general is not in a traditional attorney-client relationship with department or agency officials.47 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, for example, has held:
concedes "the whole corpus of the controversy." Bath, 226 N.C. at 505, 39 S.E.2d at 365; see also
Howard, 254 N.C. at 263, 118 S.E.2d at 903.
A consent agreement frequently has been compared to a contract. See e.g., King v. King, 225
N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 224 N.C. 275, 29 S.E.2d 901 (1944). Like
a contract, a consent judgment results from an unqualified agreement between the parties. By refusing to permit an attorney to enter a consent judgment without the knowledge and acquiescence of his
client, the courts have sought to ensure the primacy of clients' interests as clients perceive them.
It is important to distinguish the facts of Tice from those in cases involving suits brought by the
attorney general on behalf of a state agency or department but not in a representative capacity. In
Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), the County Board of Education filed a federal antitrust
action against certain dairy companies. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff's action was barred by res judicata. In an earlier action brought in state court, the
Attorney General had claimed violations of state antitrust laws by the same defendants. That litigation ended when the parties reached a consent agreement. The court held for defendants, ruling
that, for purposes of res judicata, the Attorney General and plaintiff Board of Education were the
same party and that the Attorney General had the authority to act on behalf of the County and bind
the County even though the County had not consented to the prior consent judgment.
43. See supra note 40.
44. "Neither expressly nor by necessary implication does North Carolina General Statute[s]
§ 114-2 authorize the Attorney General or his staff to concede a substantial right of a State agency as
to a matter which the General Assembly has placed within the agency's authority and discretion."
Defendant Appellee's Brief at 4.
45. Many of the compromise agreements entered into by a state attorney general involve unresolved tax liabilities. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. The distinction between these
cases and Tice rests on the concept of substantive rights. When an attorney general negotiates a
compromise agreement with a taxpayer, no substantive rights are conceded-the taxpayer's basic
obligation to pay taxes is not disturbed. In Tice, however, there is no "middle ground." Either
North Carolina will enjoy right-of-way access to the bay and complete use of the public road or it
will not. An agreement that concedes either of these two points gives up a substantive right of the
State.
46. The implied limitation on discretionary power to control litigation inhering at common law
in the Office of Attorney General is clear from the express grants of authority to the DOT. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
47. See, eg., Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen. 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334
(1975) (traditional attorney-client relationship does not exist when an attorney general "appears for"
an officer, department head, or secretary); Edmisten, supra note 1, at 17.
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The Attorney General represents the Commonwealth as well as the

Secretary, agency or department head who requests his appearance ....
He also has a common law duty to represent the public
interest ....
Thus, when an agency head recommends a course of

action, the Attorney General must consider the ramifications of that
action on the interests of the Commonwealth and the public generally,
as well as on the official himself and his agency.
To fail to do so would
48
be an abdication of official responsibility.

Belief in the primacy of the common-law duty to represent the public interest
has led some courts to uphold compromise settlements entered into by attorneys
general when the agreements were challenged by those agencies on whose behalf
the attorneys general ostensibly acted. Typically, these compromise settlements

have occurred in tax cases in which the attorney general negotiated with the
taxpayer for payment of some portion of an outstanding tax liability. 4 9 A com-

parable result was reached in an Oklahoma case in which the Attorney General
compromised and settled a price-fixing claim contrary to the wishes of the Governor.5 0 Courts generally have held that the attorney general has the sole authority to decide whether to appeal an adverse action relating to litigation
involving state agencies and departments.5 1

In each of these situations, the attorney general's decision to proceed without the approval of the agency or office represented was based on a good faith

determination that continued litigation was not in the public's best interest. The
decisions to enter into compromise agreements did not concede the agencies'
substantive rights.5 2 These cases thus are distinguishable from Tice and are
good examples of the practical application of the attorney general's common-law
duty to defend the public interest.
Not all courts have been so willing to allow the attorney general this mea-

sure of discretion when he is engaged in a representative capacity on behalf of a
state agency or department. 53 For instance, the Wyoming Supreme Court
48. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 163, 326 N.E.2d 334, 338
(1975).
49. See eg., State ex rel.Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1949) (compromise
agreement entered into by Attorney General representing Department of Revenue upheld); Lyle v.
Luna, 65 N.M. 429, 338 P.2d 1060 (1959) (stipulation of settlement entered into by Attorney General representing Bureau of Revenue upheld despite challenge by Bureau officials); Cooley v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (per curiam) (compromise agreement
between executors of estate and Attorney General representing Tax Commission upheld despite attack on agreement by two of three commissioners); see alsosupra note 45 (distinguishing tax liability
cases from Tice on basis of substantive rights).
50. State ex reL Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973) (absent legislative
or constitutional expression to contrary, Attorney General had complete control over all litigation in
which he appeared on behalf of the state).
51. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975); State
ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973).
52. See supra note 45.
53. In a 1919 North Dakota decision, the state supreme court stated:
[A]Ithough it is perfectly obvious under the statute that the attorney general is the general
and the legal advisor of the various departments and officers of the state government, and
entitled to appear and represent them in court, this does not mean that the attorney general, standing in the position of an attorney to a client, who happens to be an officer of the
government, steps into the shoes of such client in wholly directing the defense and the legal
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stated:
The rule... would seem to be that the Attorney General has power
to settle and compromise a suit, when the rights of the state are in
doubt and are in honest dispute, at least when he acts with the approval
case, have
of the executive head of the department which may, in any
54
the matter involved in the suit in his particular charge.
When confronted with a similar question, another court adopted a uniquely
practical approach: it refused to allow an assistant attorney general to compromise a subrogation claim of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. The ready
availability of individuals with authority to approve the compromise and the
absence of an emergency that precluded obtaining consent were significant considerations in the court's decision. 55
Although the Tice court carefully limited its holding to an attorney general's entry into a consent judgment without the consent of the agency or department, some of the court's dicta reflect a concern over possible overreaching by
the Attorney General and the potential for conflict between the Office of the
Attorney General and the executive branch of state government. 56 It is unclear
whether the court intended its language to be construed as a precursor to additional restrictions on the exercise of independent judgment by the attorney general when acting in a representative capacity, or whether the term "consent" as
used by the court was intended to refer solely to consent agreements. If the
court was forecasting additional restrictions, its decision in Tice may indicate a
significant potential for change in the attorney general's common-law powers,
with separation between the roles of chief law officer and representative
57
counsel.
steps to be taken in opposition or contrary to the wishes and demands of his client or the
officer or department concerned.
State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 311, 175 N.W. 372, 374 (1919); see also Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd. v. Kusic, 7 Pa. Commw. 274, 299 A.2d 53 (1973) (court distinguished between
state agency acting in an executive capacity and state agency acting in a judicial capacity; held
agency bound by Attorney General only when acting in former role).
54. State ex reL Wilson v. Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 20, 7 P.2d 216, 221 (1932) (emphasis added).
55. Robinson v. State, 63 N.W.2d 521 (N.D. 1954).
56. After reviewing the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the offices of Governor and Attorney General, the court stated:
The constitutional independence of these offices, and their differing functions and duties,
create clear potential for conflict between their respective holders. In the event of such
conflict, power in the Attorney General to resolve, without their consent, controversies
involving agencies or departments under the supervision of the Governor, could be abused
by exercise in a manner effectively derogative of the Governor's constitutional duties to
exercise executive power and to supervise the official conduct of all executive officers.
Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 55, 312 S.E.2d at 245.
57. Carried to its logical extreme Tice would lead to a "split personality" attorney general.
When dealing with a matter not involving a state agency or department, the attorney general's primary goal would be to seek a resolution in the best interest of the public generally. When acting in a
representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department, however, the attorney general
would be concerned only with implementing the will of agency heads-his role would be analogous to
that of an outside counsel. Further, he would have little choice but to implement decisions he believed to be contrary to the public's best interest or to request appointment of special or outside
counsel. See also supra note 38 (use of outside counsel should be restricted to avoid additional
expense to state).
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The North Carolina General Statutes provide that an agency may employ
outside counsel if its request is approved by the Governor.5 8 Obtaining outside
counsel would appear to be appropriate for the limited number of cases in which
the Attorney General concludes in good faith that a decision affecting the substantive rights of an executive agency would not be in the public's best interest. 59
For those disputes in which the agency's substantive rights are unaffected-that
is, when expressly delegated authority is not usurped by the attorney general's
proposed action-the common-law power to control litigation should be retained
by the attorney general. The statutorily delineated powers of individual state
agencies would be preserved, and the Attorney General would not be in a position of abdicating his official responsibility to protect the interests of the general
public.
Some observers may be disturbed by the application of Tice to only consent
judgment and substantive rights cases. One commentator has written that "the
Attorney General should be extremely cautious in attempting to substitute his
policy judgment as to what is in the public interest for that of a state agency for
which he is the lawyer." 6° This cautionary note is appropriate. Decisions of the
attorney general must not be arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith;
indeed, the courts likely wil continue to overturn such decisions. Nevertheless,
expansion of Tice would undermine the attorney general's role as the defender of
the public interest, leaving the ultimate decisions as to the proper conduct of
litigation in the hands of agency officials not vested either by statute or common
law with this authority.
In Tice the North Carolina Court of Appeals crafted a narrow holding consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law notions of the powers
inherent in the Office of Attorney General. The court's failure to preclude an
expansion of its holding to a broader range of representational questions, however, leaves open the possibility that the attorney general's powers could be further diminished. Such a limitation of authority would affect adversely both the
Office of Attorney General and the protection of the public interest that it provides. The court should close the door on this potentiality in order to preserve
the common-law powers of the attorney general.
WILLIAM

C.

HAFLETr, JR.

58. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
59. Concerning the issue of an Attorney General's reluctance to do the bidding of an executive
agency, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated:
[twhere there is a policy disagreement between the Attorney General and the Governor or
his designee, the appropriate procedure would be for the Attorney General to appoint a
special assistant to represent the Governor's interests. It is only where the Attorney General believes that there is no merit to the appeal, or where the interests of a consistent legal
policy for the Commonwealth are at stake, that the Attorney General should refuse representation at all.
Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 165 n.8, 326 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 n.8
(1975).
60. PowEas, DUTrEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 34.

